The Wild West
On 8 March 1969 the Egyptians launched a new offensive over the Suez, acting entirely with the air force and artillery. A large EAF formation hit a number of Israeli command posts, depots and artillery positions in Sinai. An escorting section of four MiG-21s, led by Maj. Shamala, was directed against four intercepting Mirages, led by Giora Yoeli and Michael Tzuk, underway along the canal. The EAF leader jettisoned his drop tank but also both R-3S missiles his aircraft carried in a mistake, so he had to hand over the interception to the rear pair of MiGs. This delay enabled the Israelis to spot the MiGs and attack. Eventually, the rear pair of MiGs was then able to sandwich the Israelis, hitting one with an R-3S missile. Eventually, however, the lead Israeli pair won overhand over the lead pair of MiGs: as Tzuk entered scissors against Lt. Abd el-Baki, flying the MiG-21 Number 2, Yoeli positioned behind him, and when the Egyptian lost energy while manoeuvring with Tzuk he was shot down by Yoeli. Lt. el-Baki ejected and was taken PoW.
Several hours later, the Egyptian artillery opened a massive barrage against the Bar-Lev Line, and President Nasser declared on radio, that Egypt is starting the „War of Attrition“. The massive Egyptian onslaught forced the IDF/AF to change its overall strategy. Bearing in mind that the EAF was flying over the Sinai every day, and that Egyptian pilots were obviously eager to engage, the Israeli interceptors were not to wait any more for the enemy, but were to be used offensively, foremost by luring the enemy into pre-selected areas where these could then be cut off from eventual support and shot down.
Additional clashes occurred through March, April, and then in May, the EAF losing a MiG-21 or two each time the Israelis set up a new trap for almost no gains in exchange. Several air battles from this period are interesting, then meanwhile accounts from both sides are now available, showing that during some of the fierce clash both sides were apparently taken by surprise. On 14 April, for example, a pair of Mirage IIICJs from 119 Squadron, flown by Reuven Rosen and Menachen Eyal, was scrambled from Refidim AB to intercept a formation of Su-7s on reconnaissance mission over Sinai. The Sukhois were escorted by four MiGs, the second pair of which was flown by Capt. Aziz Mikhail and Ismail Imam. The Israeli leader did a series of mistakes, starting with forgetting to jettison his drop tank: consequently, he was at a distadvantage after only a couple of turns, and had a MiG at his 6 o'clock. Entering scissors against the MiG, however, Rosen managed to gain advantage despite his problems: the MiG overshoot and then extended in an attempt to regain speed, swiftly distancing to more than 1.200m. Rosen then fired a Sidewinder and shot the MiG down. Meanwhile Eyal engaged another MiG and damaged it with a Sidewinder, forcing the Egyptian to disengage. Meanwhile, Mikhail was on Eyal's tail, but the Israeli successfully disengaged. Rosen failed to do so and this was his second mistake in that engagement: in an attempt to hit another MiG, he failed to see Mikhail behind his Mirage, and got hit by a R-3S. While the Egyptian claimed a kill, Rosen managed a successful emergency landing at Refidim.
The number of air battles in which the Israelis did such mistakes, and the Egyptians did as well, however, remained relatively low, and most were pretty one-sided. On 21 May, for example, the Israelis almost completely destroyed two sections of four Egyptian MiG-21s each, downing four of them in air combats and one by MIM-23A Hawk SAMs. The Egyptians claimed one Mirage as shot down, and explained the pilot ejected only to drawn in the Suez Canal.
From June 1969, the IDF intensified its operations, starting with a demonstration flight of four Mirages over Cairo, on 17th of the month. Three days later the Operation „Rimonim“ was initiated, with the objective of luring EAF interceptors into an area south of the Suez City, which was not well covered by the Egyptian radar net. In a series of battles here by 7 July, a total of nine MiG-21s and one MiG-17 were shot down, in exchange for a single Mirage IIICJ, lost on 26 June. In another - completely unrelated - air combat, caused by the activity of Israeli recce aircraft over Syria, on 8 July 1969, seven Syrian MiG-21s were shot down as well.
Nevertheless, Israeli pilots were not to get any rest. After an Egyptian commando attack against IDF installations in Sinai, on 18 July 1969, the IDF/AF was chosen to answer and three days later the Operation „Boxer“ was launched: in 171 combat sorties, the Israelis dropped something like 200ts of bombs on Egyptian SAM-sites and artillery positions. The EAF reacted only in the afternoon of 20 July with a strike against Israeli SAM-sites, but the strike package was intercepted while over the target and four aircraft were shot down by Mirages, in exchange for two Israeli fighters shot down by MiG-21s. Because of this, the IDF/AF intensified the operation Boxer for a full week, during which a total of over 700 combat sorties was flown. The result was a complete break-down of the EAF/ADF’s net of SAM-sites and radars along the Suez, massive destruction of the artillery positions, and the loss of eight MiGs. „Boxer“ was the first operation in which the IDF/AF flew pre-planned and well coordinated strikes against integrated air defences including SAM-sites, and it proved highly successful, especially as the SA-2bs could not target the low-flying Israeli aircraft.
Still, due to swift Soviet deliveries of new weapons, the EAF/ADF was fast to recover, and the IDF/AF was - now in the role of Israeli „flying artillery“ - compelled to start another massive operation, „Drizzle“, initiated in the night from 9 to 10 September. This started with commando attacks against Egyptian missile crafts, and a landing of a commando-party, equipped with captured T-55 tanks and BTR-50 APCs near the port of Ras el-Sadat. The raiders drove between the SAM-sites, destroying one after the other, and causing havoc in Egyptian organization. On the following morning the IDF/AF hit additional targets, causing ever more destruction and losses, even if losing one SMB.2 in the process, together with the pilot.
Within six weeks of launching „Boxer“, the Israelis flew over 1.000 combat sorties, destroyed two dozens of SAM-sites, and shot down 21 Egyptian aircraft, in exchange for three own fighters. Nevertheless, already on 11 September, the EAF hit back, deploying over 100 fighter-bombers against Israeli SAM-sites. Near el-Qantara four Mirages tried to cut off a formation of eight MiG-17s, several Su-7s, and eight MiG-21s, causing an air battle that extended over the Egyptian airspace, ending almost directly over the Fayid AB. While five MiG-21s were shot down by the Israelis, Maj. Fawzi Salama shot down the IDF/AF leading "ace" of the time, Giora Rom. Shortly later, in another engagement Lt. Ghema shot down Capt. Jacob Roun when this attempted to catch one of the MiGs that was in the landing pattern. The Egyptians also claimed that Capt. Mikhail shot down a Mirage IIICJ flown by pilot named Weintraub, but this kill was not confirmed, while the Israelis claimed two additional kills, for a total of seven on this day (ncluding four MiG-21s, two Su-7s and one MiG-17).
Subsequently the Egyptians even increased the pace of their operations, and on 28 October their Mi-8s deployed a commando-party near an enemy base almost 100km east of el-Qantara, causing surprise and losses to the Israelis. Such operations were a reason of grave concerns on the Israeli side, which tried to downplay the Egyptian successes, explaining that these are not capable of causing any damage, while superimposing feats of the IDF/AF’s aces. The fact was, that the EAF and the EAF/ADF suffered extensive losses in the summer of 1969, and that they were not especially successful against the Israelis in the air, but also that the EAF was also hitting back very hard, causing losses and damage too.
Therefore, the War of Attrition was continued, and on 6 October 1969, the IDF/AF was again in action, deploying 200 fighters to attack Egyptian SAM-sites along the Suez. During these operations, Israeli aircraft - foremost A-4 Skyhawks - were carrying ECM-pods for the first time, and were apparently also supported by a Vautour or two, equipped for supporting strike packages with electronic countermeasures, but also monitoring the enemy emissions. Due to this, even if the Egyptians had more SAM-sites, and were now firing many more SAMs, only one out of at least a hundred of SA-2s exploded near one A-4, causing some damage. When the EAF tried to strike back, two Su-7s were shot down, and the strike package was forced to abort.
Even if they would not admit this in public, by the time the Egyptians were now definitely on the end of their capability to continue the war at the same pace. Between July 1967 and November 1969, the EAF and the EAF/ADF have suffered a loss of 51 combat aircraft, of which 34 in air combats, nine to AAA, and eight to Israeli MIM-23 Hawk SAMs. The Egyptians have also lost at least 30 SAM-sites and over 1.500 soldiers.
Mirage IIICJ remained the mainstay of the Israeli fighter fleet for most of the Attrition War, and was the main interceptor even after the arrival of the first Phantoms. The type - nick-named "Shahak" in IDF/AF service - chalked an impressive score of over 100 air-to-air victories during this conflict. The example shown here in the colours of the 101 Squadron, was flown by Eitan Ben-Eliyahu when he claimed his first kill, on 8 July 1969.
Israeli Hammers
The situation was now to change, as the IDF/AF was short or introducing a new weapon in the War of Attrition: the powerful, fast, and lethal McDonnell Douglas F-4E Phantom II. The Phantom was the aircraft which was to fascinate not only the Israelis, but also their enemies to a degree where in the future these were prone to declare any Israeli aircraft they saw for a „Phantom“, in the manner similar to the years before, where almost each downed IDF fighter was either a “Mystére” or “Mirage” – regardless its actual type!
The arrival of the F-4E in Israel was foremost important because the type was so powerful that it could fly over 300km deep into Egypt, carrying more bombs than almost a squadron of SMB.2s, at a speed of Mirage III, albeit at a much more comfort (especially in the low-level ride) and security for the crew, and still carrying missiles for self-defence. The F-4E was also to change the behaviour of Israeli pilots in air combats: the early Phantoms they have got were still un-slated, and thus slightly less manoeuvrable than the MiG-21s or Mirages, albeit, they were much better armed. Therefore, initially after their introduction, the IDF/AF was apparently reluctant to use them for air combats, and rather tended to deploy them in demonstration groups which would initiate any operation by either attacking some target on the ground, or dragging enemy interceptors towards places where smaller and more agile Mirages waited in ambush. The Phantom introduced also more modern, built-in, ECM-systems to the IDF/AF, which were not only showing the threat to the pilot, warning him to start evasive manoeuvring, like standard RWRs, already introduced on Skyhawks and upgraded SMB.2s, but also automatically jamming enemy radars. In addition, the aircraft had an integrated navigation and attack suite, which was easing the work of the crew.
Neither the Egyptians nor the Soviets could put anything similar like the F-4E into the air: the Soviets would not supply them any of their more modern or powerful fighters (not that they have had many at the time, as the new generation with MiG-23s and MiG-25s was still in the development phase), and the Libyan deal for Mirage III/5s was still in its early stages. What Moscow made available were Su-20s, which at the time were a simple derivative of the Su-7B, albeit with wings which outside parts could be swept, thus simplifying operations, while increasing the payload and range. However, even the Su-20s would not reach Egypt before 1972.
Meanwhile, the Israeli Phantoms flew their first combat missions in the frame of the Operation „Pirkha“, initiated on 22 October 1969, with a strike of four Phantoms against two Egyptian SAM-sites near Abu Sawayr AB. The power of the new fighter was immediately demonstrated: a pair of Phantoms could drop up to 18 Mk.82 bombs calibre 250kg against a single SAM-site. No object could survive such pounding, especially not the sensitive radar stations, non-armoured command vans, and launchers, and the Egyptian losses were heavy. Yet, the IDF/AF was to further increase the pressure. On 4 November, Phantoms were also „shown“ to the citizens of Cairo, when four of them thundered low over the Egyptian capital, and on 11 November, they downed their first MiG-21, during an air combat over Jebel Ataka, after another ambush was set up south of Suez. From that time on for the next two months, the two IDF/AF-units equipped with Phantoms were targeting one Egyptian SAM-site after the other, destroying at least three dozens of them by late December, including no less but eight on 15 December. As if this would not be enough, on 23 December the Israelis mounted a commando raid, which captured an Egyptian P-12 radar recently placed some 200km south of the Suez City. The radar and the support equipment were subsequently loaded under two CH-53 helicopters, and then flown out to Israel (some say, via a US aircraft carrier, waiting for the helicopters in the Red Sea).
One of the two first IDF/AF units to operate the mighty F-4E Phantom II was the 69/Patishim Squadron. The example here is shown carrying a load of five M-117 bombs under the centreline, two Sidewinders under inboard underwing pylons, two Sparrows in the rear bays, and a QRC-335 ECM-pod - a load more usually seen during the subsequent Yom Kippour War, but nevertheless clearly presenting the immense warload the F-4Es could haul, and which made them a legend of their times. The availability of the F-4 was of immense importance for Israel: although much more expensive in acquizition, they eventually enabled the IDF/AF to operate more efficiently, then a single Phantom could carry more bombs than four Mirages or eight SMB.2s. Thus, a formation of eight Phantoms could obliterate up to four SAM-sites in a single strike - a job for which the Israelis previously needed whole squadrons of earlier French-fighters. This capability enabled the IDF/AF to start its first SEAD-offensive in the frame of the Operation Blossom, but also fly numerous deep-penetration strike sorties, hitting targets all over Egypt.
High Noon
The year 1970 was to begin very bad for the EAF, as the Israelis once again changed their modus-operandi: highly experienced IDF/AF were now penetrating deep into Egypt at a very low level, and attacking MiGs directly over their air bases, preferably while in landing pattern, but often enough shortly after these were scrambled to intercept a demonstration group of Israeli aircraft. On 4 January, Mirages lured several MiGs into another ambush and downed two of them. This caused the EAF to become very careful, as the IDF/AF was now seemingly constantly mounting such operations, while, actually, the Israelis had something else in mind: three days later two Phantoms thundered in low level over the Suez, but instead of attacking some SAM-site, they continued straight towards Cairo, and then attacked the EAF training centre at Bilbeis. The surprise on the Egyptian side was complete: since the Six Day War, the IDF/AF flew no similar attacks so deep into Egypt. This was now to change, however, as this attack signalized the initialization of the Operation „Blossom“, in which the IDF/AF was to go offensive and establish a sort of air superiority along the Suez Canal. Three days later several ammunition depots near Cairo were hit. On 18 January, also the bases near Hulwan, and the Camp Watza were attacked and severely damaged. Each time, Egyptian interceptors were not able to react, as the fast and powerful Phantoms were back over Sinai before they could be scrambled.
In February the IDF/AF continued attacking EAF/ADF SAM-sites, usually deploying eight F-4Es armed with M-117 bombs to hit several sites simultaneously, foremost in the areas around Dahshur and Hulwan. During one of these strikes, on 9 February, the Mirages and MiGs clashed once again, with each side losing one aircraft, even if the Egyptians claimed two Israelis as shot down: certainly, only the IDF/AF pilot Avinoam Keldes was captured. Over the following weeks and months the Israelis gradually moved their targets further south along the Red Sea coast, generating a series of deadly duels against the SAMs.
The Operation „Blossom“ was obviously too successful: it clearly illustrated the whole Egyptian military and civilian population, that the IDF/AF could strike all over Egypt and cause tremendous - sometimes shocking - damage and losses, without even being disturbed. The war was thus brought directly to Egypt, and the leadership in Cairo compelled to request even more help from the Soviets. Moscow was not especially interested to increase the Egyptian capability to fight: Moscow was interested in keeping Arabs under control and supplying them only with (what the Soviets though was) enough weapons to defend themselves, but nothing else. The Soviet leadership knew very well that any larger conflict could easily escalate into a direct confrontation with the USA – and this could lead into an all-out global conflict. Besides, most of the Soviet leadership could simply not understand the Arab wish for more and more advanced weapons. Nevertheless, the USSR was not ready to admit a defeat of its arms – especially not at the hand of a US-built system supplied to Israel. Consequently, a decision was taken to “show” – the Egyptians, Arabs, and the World – what the Soviets were able.
Before the first units of the Soviet Air Defence Force (V-PVO) could arrive in Egypt, however, the Operation „Blossom“ was continued, with new attacks against targets deep inside Egypt being flown at least two or three times a week. By 26 February, when the EAF/ADF MiG-21s managed for the first time to force four Phantoms to abort their mission (albeit, losing three aircraft in an encounter with escorting Mirages), the F-4Es of the 69th and 201st Sqns. IDF/AF flew a total of 118 combat sorties deep into Egypt. In addition, Mirages and Phantoms equipped with reconnaissance equipment flew several dozens of recce missions over all the Egyptian main bases, gathering immense amounts of intelligence. In early March, some of these produced photos showing the first Soviet troops which landed in Egypt.
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