|
|
the ismailia riots
" the lancs & the tanks go into action "
note: After reading this chapter please take a moment to read ex royal marine james robinson’s version of the ismailia riots here
this account is of the battle that took place in ismailia towards the end of 1951. It was reported in great detail in the "gallipoli gazette" of april 1952 (the newsletter of the lancashire fusiliers) "this web site is grateful to captain (rtd) j. O'grady, curator of the museum of the lancashire fusiliers, for his permission to reprint this article in its entirety.
When the egyptian government abrogated their treaty with great britain on the 15th october 1951, the 1st bn. The lancashire fusiliers was warned to be ready for internal security duties in ismailia on the following day. "a" company was placed on one-hour notice to move, while the remainder of the battalion was held at four hours notice. Since no measures were allowed to be taken that would give the egyptians any cause for complaint, it was not possible to send troops into town, as a precautionary measure, to be immediately available in case of trouble. The battalion was therefore held in readiness in its barracks at moascar, some two miles from the british residential area of ismailia.
At about 8.15 am on the 16th october, a party of egyptians arrived from cairo and started anti-british demonstrations in the square outside the railway station. A large crowd soon collected and was whipped up into an excited frenzy. The mob started by overturning british cars and trucks, looting their contents and setting them on fire. The civil police made a few half-hearted attempts to disperse them and there was a comparative lull at about 8.45 a.m. British service families, who were in the town in the normal way, took the opportunity to return to their homes but some thirty women and children took refuge in the n.a.a.f.i grocery store in station square.
At about 9.15 am the ringleaders led a large crowd to the n.a.a.f.i, set fire to the fence, forced an entry and started looting. The n.a.a.f.i staff and service families were driven into the back premises. At the same time, large crowds were wandering about and shouting in different parts of the town. The situation was completely out of control, the police making little effort to restore order. The commander 3rd infantry brigade, therefore ordered "a" company of the lancashire fusiliers into the town. The commanding officer issued instructions for "a" company to establish itself in french square and to rescue the british people cut off in the n.a.a.f.i.
"a" company immediately proceeded to french square in three-ton lorries. The square was full of rioters, who were crowding around buses, army vehicles and private cars, which they had set on fire. There were a number of egyptian police in the square but they were not taking any effective action to disperse the rioters. As soon as the crowd saw the troops arrive they dispersed rapidly in the direction of the station and without any further action being taken the square was cleared. Major t.p. Shaw debussed his company, less one platoon, and put them on the ground in french square with a bren gun covering all roads leading into it. At the same time he ordered 2 platoon to proceed without delay to the n.a.a.f.i with the two empty three-ton lorries in order to rescue the trapped families and bring them back to safety, and on completion of this task to rejoin the company.
There was a large mob in the square outside the n.a.a.f.i, who were by this time completely out of control. They were looting, overturning and firing vehicles, and throwing stones and bottles at any europeans who showed themselves. The crowd outside the n.a.a.f.i scattered as the vehicles drove up and they pelted them with stones and bottles. 2nd lt inchbald debussed his platoon a few hundred yards from the n.a.a.f.i, left an escort of about five men with the vehicles, and proceeded with the rest of his platoon to the n.a.a.f.i on foot.
Four armed military police were in the n.a.a.f.i building protecting the families, but they were hemmed in by the crowds. The n.a.a.f.i grocery store by this time was swarming with looters and the building was on fire. 2nd lt inchbald drove the crowd back from the immediate vicinity of the n.a.a.f.i, and disposed his sections around it.
He then proceeded to escort the families from the buildings to the waiting vehicles. The crowd closed in again by this time. Many of them were drunk from the whiskey they had looted from the grocery store and the vehicles were again pelted with stones and bottles. 2nd lt inchbald then ordered cpl. Kennedy and the platoon sgt. To fire two rounds at the rioters and this drove them back to a safe distance. The women and children were then put in the vehicles and covered up with tarps and camouflage nets to protect them from flying stones and bottles. Most of the families were put on the centre vehicle with the two halves of the platoon in the rear and leading vehicles. 2nd lt inchbald drove the families and the n.a.a.f.i staff to the blue kettle restaurant where there was a military police post and then rejoined the company in french square'
"army mansions" : One of the ismailia
blocks of flats in which moascar
families were installed
in the meantime lt. Col. Bamford arrived in french square shortly after the company. He immediately took major shaw and a small escort to the n.a.a.f.i to reconnoitre the area. 2 platoon, with the families, were leaving the n.a.a.f.i just when this party arrived. There was still a very hostile crowd in the square that seemed to be increasing in numbers. Lt. Col. Bamford ordered the party to fire several shots into the n.a.a.f.i to clear it temporarily of looters and also at the crowd, which at this time were closing in and pelting the party with stones. As a result of this recce the commanding officer ordered major shaw to clear the area of the n.a.a.f.i, of the rioters and drive them back along the parallel roads leading into arab town. He also ordered "c" company to proceed to french square as quickly as possible from barracks.
As soon as "c" company arrived in french square, "a" company moved out to disperse the rioters from the square in front of the station. The company moved in column of platoons with a party of sten gunners, together with the platoon commander in front of each platoon. After a few shots had been fired, the crowd rapidly withdrew from the square and crowded into the streets leading into arab town. On the approach of the leading troops, most of the looters in the n.a.a.f.i fled in panic. It was noticeable that amongst them were one or two egyptian policemen. After the n.a.a.f.i and the square had been cleared the company paused to reorganize before clearing the streets leading into arab town. At this time a large number of police reinforcements under the command of their own officers arrived in the square but it was evident that they were in sympathy with the rioters and very little could be expected of them. Their own officers, at this stage, were mainly concerned with trying to persuade the various commanders of troops on the spot to exercise the greatest moderation in dealing with the rioters. They seemed oblivious to the fact that the n.a.a.f.i close to them was looted and burnt, that the square was full of vehicles overturned and gutted by fire, and that a large mob was trying to break into the cellars of army mansions, a large block of married quarters near by.
On the arrival of one of "c" company's platoons at the n.a.a.f.i, "a" company proceeded to drive the mob down the parallel streets leading from the station square and at right angles to the rue telatine, which was the physical boundary of arab town. At this time, the crowds who had been driven from the square were bunched together in large numbers along the streets and were still very hostile. Anti british slogans of the vilest nature were being shouted and stones and bottles were being thrown. The company was now split up into columns, each column being in position at the entrance to each particular street. It was hoped that the threat of troops advancing towards the crowd with bayonets fixed would suffice to get them moving back in different directions but this was not so. Although the crowd at the head of each street started to move back, those behind them who could not see what was happening in front, held their ground. After one or two unsuccessful attempts to move the crowd back in this way, the centre column fired two or three bursts of sten on the ground at a safe distance from the crowd. This was immediately taken up by all the columns on the left and right who did likewise. The noise of these bursts, which opened up almost simultaneously and was accentuated by the echo from the numerous buildings, sounded most effective and the crowd began to move back in haste. After advancing another two hundred yards or so, the columns opened up again and panic set in amongst the rioters as they ran in confusion back across the rue telatine into arab town. During this advance communication was temporarily lost between the columns, but the rate of advance was approximately the same and each column knew that company headquarters was moving at the head of the centre one. On arrival at the rue telatine, contact was re-established throughout the company.
Major shaw put small parties of men, about half sections, on the ground to cover each of the numerous streets leading off the rue telatine. The latter was bounded on one side by the rue mohd ali and the sweet water canal and on the other side by the railway line. There were a great many of these streets, and as a result so long was the company perimeter that they were of necessity rather thin on the ground and the whole company was committed without the company commander being able to keep a reserve on hand to move to any threatened point. No. 31 set communication with battalion hq, which by this time was established, in french square, and each platoon had a no. 88 set. On account of the numerous buildings that separated platoon hq from each other. No. 88 set communication was not satisfactory.
During the clearing of the square and subsequent advance into arab town, several casualties had to be inflicted on the more extreme of the rioters. This had a great effect on the remainder, who for the rest of the day showed a healthy respect for the troops. The troops themselves, many of them young soldiers who had just recently completed their preliminary training and only recently arrived from the united kingdom, remained very calm in the face of extreme provocation from the crowd who were in a very ugly mood. There was no indiscriminate firing and when fire was opened it was controlled and the minimum of force was used.
The perimeter along the rue telatine was established by 1300 hrs, and the situation seemed to be completely restored. The large crowds had vanished amongst the many streets and garrets of arab town. Tea and a very welcome hot meal were sent up at this time and the c.q.m.s distributed the food by doing a "milk round" to each street in turn.
In the afternoon crowds began to concentrate along the rue telatine at various points. The main concentration was on the extreme right in front of 2 platoon's area near the railway line. They were crowding in along the perimeter and gradually increasing in numbers they seemed to be regaining their confidence. These crowds were difficult to deal with. They were not a vast mob out of control under the influence of mob hysteria as the morning rioters had been. They contained an equal number of extremists and talkative individuals who were urging moderation to the former and curious onlookers.
The extremists were attempting to force their way through the cordon and engage individual sentries in arguments. The more moderate individuals were arguing with the extremists and trying to engage the troops in reasonable discussion, while behind there was a rapidly increasing number of curious onlookers who might be persuaded either way and who were gradually pushing those in front closer into the perimeter. Major shaw visited 2 platoon area and decided to reinforce this area with troops from quieter parts of the perimeter. 2nd lt inchbald made several attempts to drive the crowd away by the threat of troops moving forward with fixed bayonets. He then ordered a few shots to be fired at the crowd and the latter dispersed rapidly. A similar crowd had concentrated close to 1 platoon perimeter and sgt. Wall was compelled to open fire, after which the crowd dispersed rapidly.
While the crowds were forming, the egyptian police, moving from east to west along the rue telatine in trucks, attempted to disperse the crowds. On two occasions the method used was to drive rapidly up the rue telatine and to fire over the heads of the crowd from moving vehicles. These methods were quite ineffective and on two occasions completely innocent individuals, sitting by the road at street cafes, were hit and wounded.
At approximately 1600 hrs, lt. Colonel bamford sent up supplies of concertina wire and tar barrels filled with stones to form some sort of physical barrier for the cordon. C.s.m. Smith quickly dumped these stores at the end of each street and organized their erection and within an hour each street was blocked with two strands of concertina wire with two or three tar barrels behind them... The half sections protecting each street took up positions behind these obstacles and the bren gun was put into position at the end of each of the larger streets. Although these wire barriers were not in themselves very formidable obstacles, their psychological value was beyond measure and it became obvious to all the population of arab town that any attempt to force these barriers would result in fire being opened from behind the wire. On the extreme left of the perimeter a roadblock was established on the rue mohd ali. This was part of the main road to port said and was very crowded with traffic. Captain porter, second in command of the company, was in charge of this sector. All vehicles moving up the road were stopped and the occupants inspected.
At 1600 hrs lt. Colonel bamford visited major shaw and inspected the perimeter in detail. He considered that the company was too thin on the ground for their night dispositions and decided to reinforce the area with "d" company, who arrived at the rue telatine at approximately 1730 hrs. The perimeter was accordingly strengthened. By this time several egyptian police officers and ncos had arrived at the perimeter and rendered valuable assistance at the barriers.
The night passed quietly and soon the company settled down to a normal routine. A curfew was imposed on the whole of arab town each night after 1900 hrs.
The company "stood to" each morning and evening and were inspected by major shaw or lt. Colonel bamford. Sentry rosters were made out for the day and double sentries were on duty for two hours at a time by day and night at the barriers. In each platoon area either the platoon commander or platoon sgt. Was standing by. C.s.m. Smith organized the distribution of food, stores and ammunition. The platoon commander and platoon sgt. Relieved each other for varying periods by day and night. The troops, in their usual adaptable manner, made themselves comfortable in the narrow and dirty streets behind the barriers and were cheerful throughout. Several isolated officers and other ranks families living close to the perimeter did everything in their power to add to the troops comfort. Relays of tea and sandwiches were sent by them to the barriers, newspapers and magazines of every sort were distributed amongst the troops, and several of them allowed the officers and sergeants to take very welcome hot baths in their houses.
Except for one small demonstration on the 17th october, no further incidents took place in the town while the battalion remained in control. On thursday 18th october, the goc agreed to allow the egyptian police to resume control, although two companies were to be held in the town in immediate readiness in the event of the police losing control. The battalion therefore handed over the cordon to the egyptian police at 1600 hours. "a" company returned to moascar, while "c" and "d" companies went into billets in the town.
An anti-terrorist patrolduring the month of december there had been considerable sniping at vehicles using the road that passes via abu sueir from moascar to tel el kebir (tek). This road is one that was peculiarly suited to the terrorists' practice of lying up for a vehicle, firing a few bursts of automatic fire at it and then hastily disappearing to avoid reprisals. The road was, until recently, the only one between moascar and tek and was therefore much used by military traffic. Added to this was the fact that along its entire length on one side it was bordered by the sweet-water canal, where high banks gave excellent cover for snipers, who could easily retreat into the villages and hamlets that lay in the cultivated land beyond. It was from behind this cover, in fact, that all the sniping had come. Up to the beginning of january the only counter-measures that had been taken were motor patrols along the road but these had proved unsuccessful as the high banks of the canal prevented aimed fire from being directed at the snipers. On 4th january, however, it was decided this nuisance had continued long enough and that the battle would be carried into enemy territory and foot patrols sent across the sweet water canal.
Three platoon commanders lt.'s taylor, inchbald and 2nd lt. Davis, were therefore called by major agar to be briefed on the tasks of their patrols. Lt. Taylor was to command the road patrol which, in conjunction with a troop of the 4th/7th dragoons, was to cover the crossing of the sweet water canal by the two other patrols commanded by lt. Inchbald and 2lt. Davis.
Due to the very heavy guard commitments it was decided that the patrols should consist of entirely volunteers; these were very quickly forthcoming and two patrols of two non-commissioned officers and eight men were formed. Their task was to cross the canal and patrol areas about two miles apart, from which sniping had recently taken place and to intercept thugs going to and returning from the canal bank. The g.o.c. Himself had taken an interest in the patrols and expressed confidence in a "bag". It was rumoured that lt. Taylor wanted to use his vickers machine gun as indirect fire support but the other two patrol commanders quickly squashed his suggestion.
Once assembled, the orders for dress and administration were soon given to the patrols. They were to leave barracks at 1715 hrs, so an early meal was ordered for 1630 hrs. Dress was to be warm but to give complete freedom of movement. Cap comforters were decided on as being the best form of headgear, sweaters and battle-dress trousers for warmth, with denim slacks to keep off the mud. Gym shoes were worn for quiet movement and speed if necessary. Their armament catered for any eventuality. They took with them two bren guns, a 2-inch mortar with both illuminating and h.e. Bombs, five sten guns and three rifles. In addition each man carried two mills grenades. During the afternoon a rehearsal of the patrol formations and signals was held and all the automatic weapons and magazines were tested. As well as the offensive weapons taken, two very pistols for communication between the patrols were included. The signals were simple. One red light to show position, and request assistance, and one green for cease-fire.
The final preparation was completed with a coating of wet sticky cocoa powder plastered over face neck and hands until the patrol was almost taken for its opponents.
The patrols left barracks at 1715 hrs and moved down to the road junction where they were to rendezvous with the armoured cars of the 4th/7th dragoons. They had not arrived when the patrols got there but a great deal of shooting could be heard going on up the road and tracer was being fired across the sweet water canal. 2nd lt. Davis decided not to wait for the dragoons but to push across the canal and attempt to join the battle with the terrorists. The assault boat was hastily unloaded, assembled and sent on its way across the canal. As it reached the other bank the armoured cars could be heard approaching and lt. Taylor decided to wait for their arrival before moving off. When the cars were about 300 yards away, rifle fire was opened on them from across the sweet water canal; they immediately stopped and fired back. 2nd lt. Davis's patrol was then moving in this area and only by promptly putting up a green very light was disaster averted. 2nd lt. Davis immediately went in search of the thugs but was unsuccessful. The two other patrols went on in company with the dragoons, who said they had been involved in an incident in which the egyptians had shot up two raf vehicles, killed one nco, and wounded another and one officer. They hastened up the road towards this place, where it was decided that lt. Inchbald should take his patrol across. After going about a mile they were fired on from an area by an orchard and lt. Taylor stopped and returned fire with a light machine gun and 2 inch mortar while lt. Inchbald and the armoured cars pressed on up the road. A good crossing place was reached close to the scene of the accident and the assault boat launched. The crossing went without incident and the armoured cars joined with lt. Taylor and continued with their patrol.
On reaching the other bank, lt. Inchbald left cpl. Hardy and two fusiliers with a light machine gun to guard the boat and taking the rest of his patrol, moved quickly along under cover of the canal bank. After going for some 200 yards they struck inland to the cover of a line of palm trees. There was no sound of enemy activity now and the patrol therefore laid up in ambush on one of the main paths leading to the canal in the hope of waylaying some of the culprits returning to the villages.
After lying up for about twenty minutes on the cold wet ground, the patrol was becoming a little restless when three shots rang out from the canal bank. Instantly the whole patrol was alert. After a few minutes cpl. Wilson suddenly saw three natives hurrying down the path towards them. The patrol was tense, waiting for the absolute recognition of the natives. They came towards the waiting patrol one man lagging about ten yards behind the other two. When they were about forty yards away it could be clearly seen that they were carrying weapons of some kind and at the patrol commanders order, fire was opened. All three natives dropped in their tracks, the first two killed outright. The third one however, was not hit and fired back at the patrol. He then disappeared, presumably along one of the irrigation ditches, and a search failed to find any trace of him. The first two were found to be armed with sten guns that had obviously been fired that evening, and several magazines of ammunition. These were taken and the bodies left on the track where they would be found next morning.
The patrol continued on its way until it came to the village from which a great deal of the firing had come earlier in the night. This had been heavily strafed by the armoured cars, and there was no sign of life whatsoever. One of the native palm-thatched huts was still burning, and nearby was a dead donkey lying grotesquely on its back. They cautiously entered the village and slowly and silently moved through, seeing and hearing nothing until suddenly rounding the corner of a house a big dog leapt snarling and whining from almost under their feet. Startled fusilier walters, who was carrying a mortar, jumped back and crashed into the rifle of the man behind him and fell to the ground, fortunately unhurt. The incident caused considerable mirth when we were safely back in barracks but at the time no one found it at all amusing, least of all fusilier walters.
It was now time for the patrol to withdraw and this they did, keeping to the cover of the embankment and watching for any signs of cable-cutters on the line of the road, nothing however was seen and they arrived back at the boat. After about ten minutes the road patrol arrived and a red very light was put up signalling them to stop. The boat was loaded into the truck and the combined patrols moved on to pick up 2nd lt. Davis. The road patrol had itself been engaged in an action near moascar and had set fire to a hut from which the firing had come. 2nd lt. Davis was waiting when the patrols arrived and reported nothing seen, save for one old man on a donkey, who cheerily wished them "saida". So all three patrols returned to barracks, a successful mission accomplished.
The disarming of the police in ismailia.
The battleon thursday 24th january 1952, brigadier exham, commander of the third infantry brigade, held an "o" group at tactical headquarters at 211 transit camp on the banks of the sweet water canal, opposite arab town.
The commanding officer, lt. Colonel a. A. Agar, was told that "operation eagle", the code-name for the disarming of the police in ismailia, would take place at first light on the 25th january 1952 and that two troops of the 4th royal tank regiment and four troops of the royals were under his command for the operation. The brigade commander also ordered that an outer cordon around the town of ismailia be established at first light by the 2nd parachute battalion, the 1st battalion of the east lancashire regiment, and the royal lincolnshire regiment. This cordon sealed off ismailia proper from arab town arasha.
At 1600 hrs on the 24th january 1952, an "o" group was held at battalion h, headquarters and the commanding officer gave his orders for disarming the police the following morning. The gists of his orders were as follows;
tasks;
(a) close cordon bureau sanitaire and caracol
(b) disarm all police in ismailia.
(c) maintain law and order in ismailia.
Method:
(a) close cordon of caracol to be undertaken by one troop of the 4th royal tank regiment, two troops of the royals and six bren gun carriers of support company, with infantry sections
(b) close cordon of bureau sanitaire with one troop of the 4th royal tank regiment, two troops of the royals, less one armoured car, and two carriers of support company with infantry sections.
(c) close cordon to be in position by 1615 hrs.
(d) "a" company disarming force for caracol to be in position on the banks of the sweet water canal opposite caracol as cordon closed.
(e) battalion tactical headquarters, "c" company. Drums to be deployed as cordon closed on the bureau sanitaire.
(f) support company, less detachments and one armoured car responsible for protection of france square.
(g) main headquarters with "d" company, and medical detachment in reserve in rue mohd ali.
The account will now deal with the disarming of the police in the bureau sanitaire.
At 0620 hours a broadcasting van positioned itself opposite the bureau sanitaire screened by a centurion tank and the first broadcast was aired. During the broadcast the veterinary surgeon living in the bureau sanitaire came out and asked permission to move his family. This was given and he was sent into the bureau to tell the police to lay down their arms and surrender and that no harm would come to them. This had no effect and a second broadcast was made.
During this period and for the next fifteen minutes, the police were observed to occupy further sandbagged positions, both on the roofs of buildings and in wired and fortified positions in the garden. Further ammunition was also seen to be dumped at each position. It is appropriate now to explain that the bureau sanitaire consisted of two large double-storied buildings in the northeast corner and five single story barrack blocks scattered over the compound. The double-story buildings also possessed cellars.
Certain buildings had been connected by wire and oil drums and positions were well sited and sandbagged. The police were also assisted in their defence by heavy undergrowth and trees. Well-prepared positions had been made on the roofs of the double-story buildings. It was quite apparent that an attack was fully expected but it is probable that some surprise was achieved due to the swiftness of the mounting of the operation.
As the police had failed to comply with the second broadcast one centurion tank was ordered to enter the compound by the main gate and in so doing the gate and portion of the front wall were demolished. At about 0650 hrs a third broadcast was given. Between 0645 and 0700 hours the police fired at least six rounds, which were not returned.
As the police still refused to take any notice of the broadcasts the centurion tank, which had entered by the main gate, was ordered to fire one blank round of 20 pounder. This was, in fact the signal for the battle to commence as the firing of the round was greeted by a great volume of fire from the police directed at the tank and an armoured car opposite the main gate. Fire was returned by the troop of the 4th royal tank regiment and two troops of the royals with machine guns.
The commanding officer now ordered the sniper section, under lt. Broughton, with a wireless op to establish themselves on top of the air force building in french square. During the remainder of the operation, the sniper section assisted in clearing portions of the roofs on the bureau sanitaire, which could be observed. Several hits were seen and probably four or five police were accounted for during this action.
The commanding officer now obtained permission from brigade hq, situated near the caracol to take further action, and at 0715 hrs the centurion fired two rounds of 20-pounder h.e. At the buildings facing the main gate. Fire was again returned by the police and so a further two rounds were fired by the tank at prepared positions. Meanwhile all available small-arms fire was being brought to bear on the police. At 0745 hours a cease-fire was ordered by the commanding officer and a further broadcast was given. No notice was taken by the police of this broadcast and fifteen minutes later general fire was opened again on the police positions and a further two rounds of 20-pounder h.e. By the centurion tank opposite the main gate. A fifth broadcast was given at 0820 hours, which again met with no response from the police and so the commanding officer asked permission from brigadier exham to be allowed to take all necessary action in order to complete his task. This request was granted with the proviso that excessive force would not be used.
An "o" group was then held by the commanding officer and the gist of his orders was as follows:
(a) one troop of the 4th royal tank regiment to enter the compound and fan out into position to assist assault by infantry by firing two rounds of 20- pounder h.e. Per tank, (six rounds in all) prior to the assault and to support infantry with machine-gun fire.
(b) one troop of the royals to lay a smoke screen under which the infantry would advance, and to support attack with observed fire.
(c) "c" company to assault the building from which they could engage the police on the roof of the bureau sanitaire.
(d) drums to occupy the building from which they could engage the police on the roof of the bureau sanitaire.
(e) "d" company ordered to french square and given the task of escorting and guarding prisoners when captured. One platoon also held in immediate reserve to reinforce "c" company if necessary.
(f) medical detachment ordered to french square to establish a dressing station.
At about 0835 hours "c" company, under major chance, supported by the fire of all available weapons (less mortars) assaulted the bureau sanitaire. Very early in the operation major chance was hit in the thigh by nine slugs and also in the heel. The command of his company was taken over by captain gribble
7 platoon, under sgt. Reid, working round the right flank made good progress by using a covered approach and without loss reached the smaller of the two main buildings in the northeast corner. The platoon then deployed to assault the building, with cpl. Connor's section alongside the building and l/cpl. H. Eastham's section in position in the rear. During the move of this section into position, l/cpl. Eastham was killed and fusilier grimes wounded.
Meanwhile 9 platoon, under 2/lt. Barber, had reinforced 7 platoon. Sniping was now coming from rooms in the king george hotel to the rear of the bureau sanitaire. 2/lt. Barber silenced the snipers with two well-aimed piat bombs. 7 platoon now assaulted with 1 section under cpl. Storer and 3 section under cpl. Connor and met opposition in clearing the top floor, which was overcome with no. 36 grenades. Meanwhile 1 section had engaged about twenty men who were trying to reinforce the smaller building. At the same time, 8 platoon had advanced behind the tanks on the left flank, with 3 section (cpl. Harrison) behind the centre tank. Fusilier lowe was killed while firing from a position near the centre tank. After the tanks had ceased firing, 8 platoon assaulted and captured a low building without opposition but firing came from a tent ten yards behind. This was soon overcome and the platoon then entered some showers in the rear and proceeded to clear them with grenades and the bayonet. Due to the noise of battle, the platoon had become split and it was during the advance of the rear element that l/cpl. Mckenzie and sgt. Foster were severely wounded. After clearing the showers and the immediate area, a foothold was gained in the main building and further casualties were inflicted on the police. Unfortunately there was no means of access from the showers to the first floor, as the stairway was on the far side of the building.
A number of actions were now taking place simultaneously. During the advance of "c" company the commanding officer had ordered a troop of the 4th royal tanks to fire a further twelve rounds of 20 -pdr. H.e at observed positions and the royals opened up with their 2-pdrs. At the same time a party of drummers under capt. Gaw, advanced down a side street to a prepared position from which the police were sniping and threw eight no. 36 grenades into the position. Heavy casualties were inflicted on the police. One section of the drums then occupied a roof position at the rear of the sanitaire and killed all the police manning positions on the roof. During this action by the drums the commanding officer had ordered a troop of the 4th royal tanks to close in on the buildings and demolish where possible. The determination of the police is now shown by the fact that the centurions were attacked with petrol bombs. Casualties suffered by "c" company up to this time were three other ranks killed, one officer and ten other ranks wounded.
The commanding officer now met with the brigade commander and it was agreed that "c" company would be withdrawn to avoid further loss of life, as the capture of the final building presented great difficulties and that the police would be battered into submission by gun fire. Consequently the commanding officer ordered a troop of the royals to lay a smoke screen under which "c" company was withdrawn without further loss.
At about 0945 hours the sixth broadcast was made and ten minutes later the police began to surrender, whereupon a section of the drums entered the bureau sanitaire by the rear gate and ejected police who failed to surrender. A police officer and six policemen refused to surrender and continued to occupy prepared positions on the main stairway, firing at the section of drums who were clearing the building. Two no. 36 grenades were thrown through a window into this police position, killing three and wounding the officer. The position then surrendered. At the same time, "c" company had re-entered the bureau sanitaire and occasional shots were still being fired by individual police. "c" company then rounded up all the police and they were escorted by "d" company, under capt. Evea, to cages in french square. The remainder of the day was spent by "c" company in collecting and checking the arms and ammunition of the police.
During this battle long-drawn-out negotiations had been in progress at the caracol, under brigadier exham, with major shaw in command of the troops. Finally at 1210 hours, after heavy fire had been brought to bear on the caracol with all weapons less 20-pounders, the police surrendered. "a" company, under major shaw, then entered the caracol and the police were placed under guard on the banks of the sweet water canal, while other parties of "a" company stacked all arms and ammunition, which were later removed.
Patrols of loyals and support company in carriers and stuarts, under captain pitt, were sent out at 1415 hours to maintain law and order in ismailia. These patrols continued until dusk, when the entire responsibility for patrolling was given to support company. The battalion, less "d" company, at about 1600 hours concentrated on the banks of the sweet water canal with one troop of the 4th royal tanks in reserve. "d" company was based on french square with one platoon in the bureau sanitaire under 2/lt. Blythe-brook and a quiet night was spent by the battalion. The following day the battalion was relieved in ismailia by the royal sussex regiment.
Casualties during the civil disturbances on 25th january 1952.
Killed
22278484 l/cpl a.e eastham ( "c ")
19038787 l/cpl h. Eastham (."c ")
22208211 l/cpl j. Mckenzie ( "c ")
22587881 fusilier j. Lowe ("c ")
wounded
major n.e.h. Chance, m.c. ( "c ")
3443875 c.s.m. B. Murphy (support)
14049995 sgt. H. Foster ("c ")
22203239 cpl. W. Harrison ("c ")
22404460 fusilier a. Siddall ("c ")
22587802 fusilier grimes ("c ")
22538468 fusilier t. Nally ("c ")
22215305 fusilier a. Allen ("c ") (dow 4/4/52)
21127616 fusilier j. Roberts ("c ")
22393400 fusilier fenton ("c ")
those who were killed were buried with full military honours with drums beating and a firing party, made up of members of "c" company, was under the command of sgt. Reid.
The" lads from lancashire" performed in the best traditions of the british army, yet recognition was not to be theirs. Sometime later the regiment was shipped off to kenya to fight the mau mau. John (jock) marrs
|
|
آخر 10 مشاركات
12th August 2008, 11:46 AM
العرض العادي
